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BUYER'S LIABILITY FOR INDUCING VIOLATIONS OF

SECTIONS 2(D) AND 2(E) OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
I. INTRODUCTION

The Robinson-Patman Act' was passed by a Congress which was under great
pressure from small independent retailers, brokers, and wholesalers seeking relief
from the increasing economic power of chain stores.2 The statute, described as
a combination antitrust law and National Recovery Administration provision
was designed to infuse the "golden rule" into economics: to prohibit discrimination against buyers by sellers.4 The act proscribes discrimination in price,"
brokerage fees,6 promotional allowances, 7 and services.>
1. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-b, 21(a) (1964). The Supreme Court has
passed on only one case, FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959), involving
§ 2(e), 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1964); one case, Automatic Canteen Co. of
America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953), involving § 2(f), 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f)
(1964); and has never passed on § 2(d), 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964).
Since courts of appeals' decisions are not binding upon the Federal Trade Commission, but
are only persuasive, see The Supreme Court and the Robinson-Patman Act, 9 Antitrust Bull.
29, 47-50 (1964), the lack of Supreme Court decisions has left a void which allows the
Commission great discretion in interpreting the act.
2. See generally Stocking, Workable Competition and Antitrust Policy 223 (1961);
Rowe, The Robinson-Patman Act: Elements of a Price Discrimination Violation, 51 Ill.
B.J. 538, 539 (1963). For a short discussion of the changes in merchandising which caused
pressure on the small retailer, see Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman
Act 3-6 (1962).
Senator Logan, one of the act's more ardent proponents, stated during the debate in
Congress: "Do not tell me that any manufacturer willingly and gladly gives such tremendous
sums to the purchaser. He is coerced into it by the fact that the purchasing power has
become so great that the seller is afraid to antagonize it. He must yield to any demand
that may be made by the great purchaser . . . " 80 Cong. Rec. 6281 (1936). The chainstore investigation carried on by the FTC at the request of the Senate provided evidence
of the large buyers' coercive power. See FTC, Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation,
S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-26 (1935).
3. Rowe, supra note 2, at 539.
4. 80 Cong. Rec. 7886, 7887, 8114 (1936) (remarks of Representative Patman).
5. Section 2(a) states, in part: "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged In
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition . . . ." 49 Stat.

1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
6. Section 2(c) states, in part: "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce . . . to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission,
brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for
services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods .... ." 49 Stat. 1527 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1964).
7. Section 2(d) states: "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce
to pay or contract . . .for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such
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Prohibitions against discrimination in the granting of promotional services
and allowances were placed in the act after congressional hearings demonstrated
that large buyers and chain stores were using their economic power to force
sellers to contribute large amounts towards their advertising expenses.0 In presenting the final version of the bill to the House, Representative Utterback,
Chairman of the House-Senate Conference Committee, declared:
Discriminatory prices and allowances are a millstone around the nec of the manufacturer, large or small; because in granting favors to a selected few of their customers,
they give those few a competitive advantage over the rest, and enable them gradually

to drive the rest out of business and thereby to destroy them as customers. In granting
such discriminations the manufacturer is therefore committing a form of slow suicide ....
10

Thus, congressional focus was on the seller." No effective weapon against the
inducement of discriminatory allowances or services by the buyer was to be
2
found in the act.'
The Robinson-Patman Act does contain two provisions aimed at the buyer
who induces the seller to discriminate. Section 2(f) prohibits any person who is
engaged in commerce "knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price"
which is prohibited by the act.13 Although isolated cases before the Federal
commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or
through such customer in connection with the proccssing, handling, sale, or offering for
sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such pmron,
unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal term- to all
other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.' 49 Stat.
1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964).
3. Section 2(e) states: "That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor
of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for
resale, with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the proceing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded
to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e)

(1964).
9. Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 127 (1963); Z0 Cong. Rec.
9416 (1936) (remarks of Representative Utterback); see H.R. Rep. No. 2237, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 15-16 (1936).
10. S0 Cong. Rec. 9416 (1936) (remarks of Representative Utterback).
11. Rowe claims that this emphasis on the seller rather than the buyer was apparently
caused by fear of the unconstitutionality of such a buyer-oriented approach. See Rowe,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 23.

12. Section 2(f) renders liable a seller who knowingly induces a discrimination in price,
but fails to make similar provision for an inducement of discriminations in servic
or
allowances. 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1964); see notes 13-20 infra and accompanying text.
13. "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the courze of
such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section." Robinson-Patman Act § 2(f), 49 Stat. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f)
(1964).
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Trade Commission and the courts have held that a purchaser who induces an
advertising allowance or service violates this provision,14 most authorities are
reluctant to accept such a position. 15 The Supreme Court, in Automatic Canteen
Co. of America v. FTC,16 explicitly declined to pass on the question of whether
section 2(f) embraces the prohibitions found in sections 2 (d) and 2(e).17 In a
later case,' 8 the FTC stated that a buyer's inducement of a 2(d) or 2 (e) violation is not specifically prohibited by the act.19 Whether Congress intentionally
or inadvertently restricted section 2(f) to discriminations in price, the omission
of direct prohibitions against the inducement of discriminations in services has
in the law and, apparently, is inconsistent with the aims of its
left a loophole
20
sponsors.
Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, originally a separate antitrust statute, 21 prohibits any person from being a party to a sale which discriminates
against competing customers of the purchaser with respect to, inter alia, allowances or services for advertising in connection with the sale of goods of the same
grade, quality, and quantity.22 The section has been criticized as useless, 23 be14. See Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916, 922 (5th Cir.
1962); Miami Wholesale Drug Corp., 28 F.T.C. 485, 491-92 (1939).
15. See Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman
Act 158-59 (2d rev. ed. 1959); Baum, The Robinson-Patman Act 66-67 (1964).
16. 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
17. "We of course do not ... purport to pass on the question whether a 'discrimination
in price' includes the prohibitions in such other sections of the Act as §§ 2(d) and 2(o)."
Id. at 73 n.14. Accord, American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 111 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1962).
18. Grand Union Co., 57 F.T.C. 382 (1960), modified, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
19. 57 F.T.C. at 422-23.
20. In 1961, Representative Patman, in an attempt to fill this gap in the act, Introduccd
H.R. 124, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), to amend § 2(f) to cover all violations of § 2(a),
§ 2(d), or § 2(e). 107 Cong. Rec. 102 (1961).
21. S. 4171, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
22. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which
discriminates to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser, in that, any . . .
allowance, or advertising service charge is granted to the purchaser over and above any
. . . allowance, or advertising service charge available at the time of such transaction to
said competitors in respect of a sale of goods of like grade, quality, and quantity ....
"Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall . . . be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." Robinson-Patman Act § 3, 49
Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). Since violations of this section carry criminal
penalties, enforcement of § 3 lies with the Justice Department, not with the FTC. In 1963,
Senator Sparkman introduced S. 1935, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), to repeal the present
§ 3 and to reenact it as § 3A of the Clayton Act, thereby making the civil remedies
available under the Clayton and Sherman Acts also available under § 3. 109 Cong. Rec.
13169-70 (1963). Senator Sparkman introduced a similar bill, S. 995, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965), in 1965. 111 Cong. Rec. 1953-57 (1965).
23. See 1955 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 201.
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cause, in order to show discrimination, the Government must prove special treatment in sales of the same quality and quantity. By small variations in the
number of units, the seller and the buyer can circumvent the statutory proscriptions. 24 As a result, prosecutions under this section for granting or inducing
promotional allowances or services have been nonexistent. - 3
The Commission, however, in recent years, has used Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act2 to fill the void. This section, in sweeping terms, prohibits unfair methods of competition. Thus, in Grand Union Co.,2 the FTC
found that the supermarket chain induced certain suppliers to buy advertising
space on its sign in Times Square. This action caused the suppliers to violate
the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act since the suppliers did not offer
similar allowances to Grand Union's competitors.
The Commission felt that it had authority under section 5 to prohibit practices adversely affecting competition in violation of the policies of the antitrust
laws, although the practices were not specifically prohibited.23 On appeal to
the Second Circuit, the Commission's asserted jurisdiction was upheld. -0 The
court decided that the FTC was not legislating a new antitrust prohibition:
"Jurisdiction ... has been e'panded from the technical confines of § 2(d), but
only fully to realize the basic policy of the Robinson-Patman Act, which was
to prevent the abuse of buying power.""0
24. See Wilson, Control of Advertising and Promotion Under the Robinson-Patman Act
in Retailing Profitably Under the Robinson-Patman Act 29 (Baley ed. 1963).
25. Ibid.
26. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 52 Stat. 111 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 49
(1964).
27. 57 F.T.C. 332 (1960), modified, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
2S. 57 F.T.C. at 419. The respondent had argued that the Commission was extending,
vithout authority, the scope of § 2(d) by using § 5. The Commission relied on past decisions of the Supreme Court, id. at 419: FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344
U.S. 392 (1953); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 US. 603 (1943); Fashion Originators
Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 US. 457 (1941); FTC v. Beech-Nut Pac"ing Co., 257 US.

441 (1922).
29. Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
30. Id. at 93. (Emphasis omitted.) The Commission's dissenting opinion, 57 F.T.C. at
426, and the court of appeals' dissent, 300 F.2d at 104, concluded that the FTC was
establishing a new rule of law. Both dissents also criticized the per se nature of the Commission's findings insofar as the FTC did not consider relevant the question of whether
Grand Union's activity had an effect on competition. Ibid.; 57 F.T.C. at 429. Such a
finding would be necessary in a 2(f) proceeding, but not in a 2(d) action. See note 69
infra. Judge Mloore, dissenting in the court of appeals, stated that, even accepting the
majority's position that § 5 of the FTC was applicable here, "we still must decide whether
to look to 2(d) or to 2(f) to determine the other 'indicia of illegality. In answering this
question, the majority . . . feels that it can dearly sense the pulse of Congress in 1936
and concludes that Congress would have wanted the court to make the buyer's participation
in a 2(d) transaction a per se violation of Section 5 ....
I cannot find any evidence
that Congress would have expanded 2(d) rather than 2(f)-had it desired to extend the
Act to buyers." 300 F.2d at 104. (Emphasis omitted.) (Footnote omitted.)
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ELFMENTS OF A VIOLATION

A. Knowingly Induce
Because of the hybrid nature of this type of section 5 complaint,3 ' it must
allege that the buyer knowingly induced a seller to violate section 2 (d) or section
2(e).32 This requirement does not, however, excuse culpable ignorance. In Giant
Food Inc. v. FTC,33 the court held that the standard of knowledge should be
whether the buyer, at the time that it induced or received payments, possessed
information sufficient to put it on inquiry as to whether the supplier had made
such payments available to competitors. The FTC has held that the knowledge
requirement is not affected by the current legality of the practice; that proof
need only show that the buyer knew the facts upon which the later findings of
illegality were based. 34 Thus, the buyer must anticipate the Commission in an
area where predictability is the exception rather than the rule.
The Commission and the courts have left undecided, however, the question of
whether inducement in this context means solicitation and receipt of discriminatory allowances or services, or whether solicitation alone would be sufficient
grounds on which to predicate a section 5 violation. 8
B. Competing Customers3"
In a proceeding against a buyer for inducing discriminatory allowances or
services, the Commission must show that the benefits were not available to
other purchasers who were competitors of the favored customer.3 7 Since the
victim of the alleged discrimination must be a 38purchaser, a mere refusal to
sell does not constitute an offense under the act.
31. Id. at 102 (dissenting opinion).
32. Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1962), modifying 57 F.T.C.
382, 410 (1960).
33. 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963).
34. Furr's, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) 1f 17352, at 22518 (Oct. 20, 1965).
35. The court of appeals, in American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 111 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962), stated: "Neither the Commission nor the courts have
held that an attempt to induce or inducement . . . without a concomitant receipt of
illegal payments, violates § 5." This position appears to have been followed in Giant Food
Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963), and
R. H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1964). But see Grand Union Co.
v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1962); Individualized Catalogues, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep.
(F.T.C.) ff 16873, at 21865 (April 3, 1964).
36. In addition to requiring that the customers be in competition, there is also a commerce requirement in the act which has been held to be met if either the buyer, seller, or
the buyer's competitors are in interstate commerce. Shreveport Macaroni Mfg. Co. v.
FTC, 321 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 971 (1964).
37. See Furr's, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) ff 17352, at 22516 n.6 (Oct. 20, 1965).
It will be noted that § 2(d) refers to customers and § 2(e) refers to purchasers. Following
the court's position in American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1962), these
words will be used interchangeably.
38. Ben B. Schwartz & Sons v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 92, 99 (E.D. Mich.
1962).
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The Commission has narrowly construed the definition of competing customers
to conform with trade practices, 39 and has made provision for regional or local
'promotions without requiring that such promotions or allowances be offered in
other localities.'0 The definition of competing customer has been further limited
by the Second Circuit. To be a competing customer, the court, in Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC,41 held that the other customer must be a purchaser of a
product of like grade and quality. In Atalanta, a meat packer supplied one
customer with a special advertising allowance on pork shoulder picnics, canned
hams, and Canadian bacon. No other purchaser in the area bought these
products within five months of the "favored" customer, although other purchasers did buy other pork products. The Commission accepted the hearing
examiner's contention that "ham is ham"4 2 and that, therefore, all the purchasers were in competition with each other.4 3 The Second Circuit rejected this
argument, holding that, although the source was the same, the products were
different, and that the purchasers were not in competition.
Once retailers in the same location have been sold similar goods, the Commission and the courts have held them to be in competition although their merchandising practices and clientele may be quite dissimilar. In FTC v. Simplicity

Pattern Co.,4 the defendant had two types of customers, large chain and variety stores and small fabric shops. The defendant argued that these stores were
not in competition since their motivation in selling the patterns was different.
The large variety stores sold them for profit; the fabric stores sold them as an
accommodation to their customers. The Supreme Court rejected this "motivation
theory" of competition, stating that "the existence of competition does not depend on such motives. '45 Rather, the Court noted that both types of stores
desired to sell the patterns, especially since their liquid assets were tied up in
maintaining a selection of the patterns.4 0
Perhaps the most difficult problem in deciding who is a competing customer
arises from the competitive relationship between retailers and wholesalers. Recent Commission action47 appears to follow earlier court decisions which held
that a seller violates the act by giving a retailer a promotional allowance not
given to a wholesaler.' s The Ninth Circuit took a contrary position, however, in
Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC,4 9 holding that a food distributor who granted
39. See Rowe, op. cit. supra note 2 at 396-97; Wilson, supra note 24, at 31-32.
40. FTC, Guides for Advertising Allovances and Other Merchandising Payments and

Services; Compliance With Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Clayton Act, As Amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act 6 (1960).
41. 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1953).
42. Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565, 569 (1956).
43. Id. at 572.
44. 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
45. Id. at 62.

46. Id. at 62-63.
47. Fred Meyer, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.)
16363 (March 29, 1963).
48. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 53-55 (1943); Krug v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.NJ. 1956).
49. 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964).
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an allowance to area retailers, but not to a wholesaler, did not violate section
2 (d) since there was no functional competition between them. Only if the wholesaler's customers had direct dealings with the distributor so as to become its
"indirect customer" would the act be violated by the distributor.5 0 The conflict
between these positions is, therefore, still unresolved. The Commission's current
position that, in reality, retailers and wholesalers are in competition for the
same consumer dollars seems too broad. Rather, the central question should be
"whether competition is affected by the grant of an allowance or service . . . "
This position escapes the narrowness of the straight functional approach to
competition which fails to consider the economic realities of marketing and distribution systems. The Commission's broad approach appears to overlook the
central purpose of the act-to protect the competitive position of the small
enterprise.
Whether the Commission is charging a seller with violating section 2(d) or
section 2 (e), or a buyer with violating section 5, the central issue of this requirement remains the same-whether the purchaser who did not receive such special
treatment was a competitor.5 2
C. Benefit"8
The prohibition against promotional allowances applies only to those payments made for the benefit of the favored customer. 5' Therefore, a buyer
facing a section 5 violation may show that no benefit was received," or was
intended to be received, from the special treatment that it induced. The Commission has held that a seller's payment to a third party for the benefit of a
customer50 and allowances for institutional advertising fall within the meaning
of benefit under sections 2(d) and 2(e). 57
The question of whether intention to benefit is essential to finding a violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act has apparently been settled by the Commission and
the courts. In the "Chain Lightning" promotional plan,58 a radio station contracted with grocery chains to provide them with special advertising, in exchange
for the stores' promise to run promotional displays for certain products. The
50. Id. at 709; accord, Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565, 570 (1956), order vacated
on other grounds, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
51. Baum, op. cit. supra note 15, at 54.
52. See Furr's, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) ff 17352, at 22516 n.6. (Oct. 20, 1965).
53. "Benefit" is impliedly limited to the area of advertising and promotions, E.g.,
General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 822 (1956); Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the
Robinson-Patman Act 377 (1962).
54. See note 5 supra.
55. See Individualized Catalogues, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) 1 16873, at 21865
(April 3, 1964).
56. E.g., P. Lorillard Co., 54 F.T.C. 1550 (1958), aff'd, 267 F.2d 439, 444-45 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 923 (1959) ; See, e.g., Swanee Paper Corp., 56 F.T.C. 1077 (1960), aff'd,
291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); See also Advisory Opinion
Digest No. 6, Trade Reg. Rep. II 17375 (Nov. 23, 1965).
57. R. H. Macy & Co., 60 F.T.C. 1249 (1962), modified, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964).
58. See P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 267 F.2d 439 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 923 (1959).
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station then solicited manufacturers to purchase radio time and offered them
the additional inducement of promotional displays in the stores. The circuit
court, in P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 9 upheld the Commission in finding that participating sellers violated section 2(d) with respect to other competing stores.
Whether the sellers intended to benefit the stores was not deemed important.
"This section of the Act does not concern itself with motive or intention. It is
only concerned with the consequences which flow from an act. If those consequences eventuate, the act from which they result is forbidden"CO
The Seventh Circuit has taken a different approach. 0 ' In The Nuarc Co.,c
the FTC held that a manufacturer's purchase of advertising in a trade
magazine wholly owned by a customer violated section 2(d). Despite the separate corporate identity, the Commission held that the payments to the magazine
were payments to the customer, and refused to consider whether the payments
were for the benefit of the customer.0 The court of appeals reversed, refusing
to accept the contention that benefit was irrelevant.- 1
We believe that Section 2(d) requires a showing that some benefit accrued to, or
'asintended to accrue to, the customer....
The only benefit that could have ... accrued ... was through the indirect route of
profits ... accruing to ... the owner of both enterprises. This, without more, cannot
be the basis of a Section 2(d) violation. 60
Thus, some benefit must at least be intended for the customer, and it must be
intended for him as a customer, not in some other capacity.0 0
The test of actual benefit has also been applied to institutional advertisingadvertising aimed at community prestige and good will rather than at the sale
of a certain item. In R. H. Macy & Co. v. FTC,67 the department store was
charged with violating Section 5 of the FTCA by inducing suppliers to contribute to a special advertising campaign. This advertising was limited to public service announcements. Macy's claim that this advertising was not for its
benefit and, therefore, that suppliers did not violate section 2(d) was rejected
by the court.cs The fact that the allowances were used to promote indirectly
59. 267 F.2d 439 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 923 (1959).
60. 267 F.2d at 444. Accord, State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 258

F.2d S31, 837 (7th Cir. 195); cf. Swanee Paper Corp. v. FTC, 201 F.2d S33, 336-37 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 36S US. 987 (1962).
61. Nuarc Co. v. FTC, 3f6 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1963).
62. 61 F.T.C. 375 (1962).
63. Id. at 393. The FTC has accepted, apparently, the court of appeals' reasoning in
this situation. See Billy & Ruth Promotion, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) 9 16375
(April 3, 1964); Individualized Catalogues, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.)
16373 (April
3, 1964).
64. Nuarc Co. v. FTC, 316 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1963).
65. Id. at 582. (Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.) This position is in accord with
Commissioner Elhan's dissent. 61 F.T.C. at 393-99.
66. 316 F.2d at 582.
67. 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964).
6S. Id. at 450.
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Macy's as a store, rather than any specific product, did not preclude benefit
from arising. The purpose of such advertising was to attract more people into
the store.
D. Available on ProportionallyEqual Terms
Although failure to proportionalize is the crux of a 2(d) or 2(e) violation,09
the Commission has issued only general guidelines, concluding that "no single
way to proportionalize is prescribed by law." 7 0 This approach is justified simply

because it would be impossible to prescribe correct conduct for buyers and
sellers in every industry. 71 In general terms, the FTC has approved plans basing
allowances or services on the dollar volume of goods purchased during a specified
time, on the quantity of goods purchased during a specified time, or plans under
services to the buyer worth a certain percentage of
which the seller furnished
72
the buyer's volume.
The Commission has been liberal in its interpretation of this requirement,
realizing that exact proportionality is often impossible, 3 and stressing honesty,
rather than exactness, in establishing a promotional program.7 4
69. A prima fade case under § 2(d) or § 2(e) is made by establishing that one purchaser
received an allowance or service and a competitor did not. The seller then has the burden
of showing that these allowances or services were available on proportionally equal terms.
Thus, his position is made difficult by not knowing exactly what he must show, and, many
times, he has no idea if his conduct was proper. Some courts have maintained that the
FTC need only show that one purchaser received an allowance or service, and not that
another customer was denied such treatment. Compare State Wholesale Grocers v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959), with
Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958). See also 1955 Att'y Gen.
Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 162-63.
Similarly, a § 5 violation has been held to be a per se offense. Grand Union Co. v. FTC,
300 F.2d 92, 94-96 (2d Cir. 1962). A prima fade case against the buyer is established when the
Commission introduces sufficient evidence to show that the buyer, at the time that It
induced and received payments or services from the supplier, possessed sufficient information
to inquire whether the supplier was making such payments or services available on proportionally equal terms to competitors. Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184, 187 (D.C.
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963). The FTC, in recent decisions, has Imputed
such knowledge to the buyer upon an examination of the buyer's conduct. When some
sellers question the validity of the plan, when the buyer determines in advance the amount
of the seller's contribution, or when the buyer informs the seller that any allowance given
would not affect existing contractual arrangements, the FTC will infer that the buyer know
he was inducing a 2(d) or 2(e) violation. See ibid.; Furr's, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.)
ff 17352, at 22519-20 (Oct. 20, 1965).
70. FTC, op. cit. supra note 40, at 4.
71. See Baum, The Robinson-Patman Act 61 (1964).
72. 1955 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 189; FTC, op. cit. supra note 40, at 4.
The courts have found that these types of proportionalization are not inclusive. Vanity Fair
Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 486 (2d Cir. 1962); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,
360 U.S. 55, 61 n.4 (1959) (dictum).
73. Cf. Dantzler v. Dictograph Prods., Inc., 272 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1959).
74. See Lever Bros., 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953). This position was lauded by the Attorney
General's Committee as "workable." 1955 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 191.
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A subject of greater controversy is the availability requirement. To be available, it must be economically feasible for the customer to use the allowance.

"[TIhe Act requires a frank recognition of the business limitations of each
buyer. An offer to make a service available to one, the economic status of whose

business renders him unable to accept the offer, is tantamount to no offer to
him."75 Therefore, the alternatives offered to other customers, in addition to

being of proportionally equal value, must be of some practical value. In one
case, handbills and radio "spots" were held to be reasonable alternatives in lieu

of newspaper advertisements.70 In General Elec. Co., 7 the hearing examiner

found that the corporation violated section 2(d) by making advertising allow-

ances available only if no price or list price were mentioned in the advertisement.
This, the examiner found, made the allowance of no value to discount stores.
Because the allowance or service is not available if the buyer does not kmow
of it,78 the seller is under an obligation to inform his customers of his program

for granting such benefits.70 Although the Commission has never decided whether
an affirmative offer is required, o mere notice to salesmen to inform buyers of
the plan has been held insufficient, without a showing that such information was
actually given to the buyer.81

In a recent decision, the FTC has added the new element of exactness to the
75. State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 253 F.2d 831, 839 (7th Cir.
195S), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 947 (1959). See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co.,
150 F.2d 983, 994 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945); Atlantic Prods. Corp.,
Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) II 16676, at 21590 (Dec. 13, 1963); 1955 Att'y Gen. Nat'1 Comm.
Antitrust Rep. 189-90; FTC, op. cit. supra note 40, at S.
76. Lever Bros., 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953). In Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc, Trade Reg.
Rep. (F.T.C.)
16753, at 216S6 (July 11, 1963), aff'd, Trade Reg. Rep. (1965 Trade Cas.)
ff 71491 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the Commission held that the alternative offered to non-participants in a cooperative advertising plan-participation in a gift premium plan-vas not
proportionally equal. Ice buckets and irons did not match the valuable advertising E:ace
available to larger customers. See House of Lords, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) g 17437,
at 22672 (Jan. iS, 1966).
77. Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) ff 16330 (Mlarch 1, 1963) (initial cease and desist order),
dismissed on other grounds, Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.)
16317 (Feb. 28, 1964).
7S. E.g., Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535, 154S (1956).
79. See Vanity Fair Paper AMlls, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 4SO (2d Cir. 1962); FTC, op. cit.
supra note 40, at 4.
80. In Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 563, 575 (1962), the Commis ion stated
that an allowance is not auAilable if it has not been offered or made known to the other
customers. This should not be construed to mean that the seller must affirmatively offer to
provide the buyer with allowances or services, but rather, that such a policy must be made
known to the buyer. The court of appeals, in upholding the Commission's order, stated
that "legislative history ... argues against a construction that would require the celler to
make an actual 'offer' to all customers ... " Vanity Fair Paper BMill, Inc. v. FTC, 311
F.2d 480, 435 (2d Cir. 1962).
Si. Ibid. For all practical purposes, the FTC has disapproved of any program based on
oral, rather than written, notification. See House of Lord's, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.)
17437, at 22672 (Jan. 1S, 1966).
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notice requirement. In House of Lord's, Inc.,8 2 a manufacturer told its customers
that it would contribute fifty per cent of the cost of any advertising that they
might care to undertake. The Commission held that this violated section 2(d)
because of its vagueness. "[A] n 'offer' as vague as this, even if actually made,
simply does not convey enough information to permit an intelligent evaluation
of what is being proposed."8 3 Many buyers had interpreted the offer as one to
share the cost of newspaper advertising, which many small buyers could not
afford. Therefore, the plan was not in fact available to all the manufacturer's
84
customers.
The recent FTC decision, Fred Meyer, Inc., 5 has also injected a time element
into the determination of availability. The Commission held that the availability
provision requires "not only that competing purchasers be offered an opportunity
to receive proportionally equal payment for performing the same services, but
that they must be offered that opportunity at the same time."80 Under this reasoning, any type of allowance or service given to one buyer exclusively for a
period of time violates the act, even though competing buyers are offered other
87
types of services or the same service at a later time.

III. DEFENSES
Defenses available to 2 (d) or 2 (e) violations are limited.88 While section 2 (a)
requires a showing of injury to competition, sections 2(d) and 2(e) are per se
violations.80 The Commission need only show that one competitor received an
82. Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) U 17437 (Jan. 18, 1966).
83. Id. Uf17437, at 22671.
84. Id. Uf17437, at 22672.
85. Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) U 16368 (March 29, 1963).
86. Id. Uf16368, at 21225.
87. See generally Hickey, The Fred Meyer Case-Its Implications Under Section 2(d)
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 9 Antitrust Bull. 255 (1964). The logical conclusion would
seem to be that a seller could no longer use any unique person or object in a promotional
display (e.g., a television star to "plug" a certain product at a store, or a special car at a
dealer's showroom), since it would not be available at a competitor's establishment at the
same time.
88. Section 2(a) includes certain defenses-cost differentials and changing market conditions. These have been excluded from §§ 2(d) and 2(e). See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern
Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959). This policy has been criticized as ignoring economic realities.
"[I]t must be recognized that 'payments' made and 'services or facilities' furnished are
'price equivalent' forms of competition. So far as the buyer is concerned, such arrangements
give him his purchases at lower costs, at a lesser price. . . . If prices may recognize cost
savings ... why should not payments for services and the furnishing of services ... be permitted similarly to recognize the actualities of competition?" Barnes, The Robinson-Patman
Challenge to Buyers' Competition, 9 Antitrust Bull. 415, 483-84 (1964).
89. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 360 U.S. 55, 65, 68 & n.13 (1959); Elizabeth
Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947);
Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 129 (1963). The per so approach was
criticized by the Attorney General's Committee. 1955 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep.
191-93. The Committee was, in turn, subjected to harsh criticism by the House Select Coin-
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allowance or service and another did not.90 Section 2 (b) provides the only effective defense to such violations: it allows a seller to rebut the prima fade case of
discrimination by showing that the service or price given was made in good
faith to meet competition.91
Although meeting competition is itself an absolute defense,52 the courts and
the Commission have strictly limited it93 to allowances or services made0 1 to
mittee on Small Business. The committee report stated: "What the [Attorney Gencral's]
committee chose to overlook was that the purpose of attaching per se illegality to the
section 2(c), (d), and (e) prohibitions was precisely to force unearned commi-ons out in
the open." H.R. Rep. No. 2966, S4th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1956). The committee further
noted: "The fact of these substitutes for price conce .ions is comparatively easy to detect,
whereas the magnitude of discriminations not directly translatable into price differences is
practically impossible to measure.' Ibid.
Support for the per se approach also came from Edward Howrey, former Chairman of the
FTC. "It would be very difficult ...to administer a statute which required proof of injury
to competition in connection with . ..promotional allowances where the allovances and
services often ... are not elated to the price of the particular product ... " How-rcy, The
Federal Trade Commission and the Attorney General's Committee Report, in The Houre
Counsel and the Attorney General's Committee Report 119 (Zaidin ed. 1956).
90. See note 69 supra.
91. "[E\othing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-fade case
was made in
... by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities ...
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities
furnished by a competitor." Robinson-Patman Act § 2(b), 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(b) (1964). For many years, the Commission held that the § 2(b) defense vas not
available to a § 2(d) charge. E.g., Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535, 1549-50 (1956).

However, after the court of appeals held that the defense was available in Exquisite Form
Brassiere, Inc. v FTC, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 US. 823 (1962),
the FTC reversed its position. See J. A. Folger & Co., 61 F.T.C. 1166, 1137 (1962). This
change in policy has been criticized by Representative Patman, who claimed that Congrez3
never intended that the meeting competition defense apply to § 2(d). Patman, op. cit. supra
note S9, at 145.
92. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); 1955 Att'y Gen. Nat'1 Comm.
Antitrust Rep. 1S1-S2.
93. See, e.g, Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 US. 231 (1951); FTC v. Cement Insitute,
333 U.S. 6S3 (1943); FTC v. A. E. Staley Alfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945); Continental
Baking Co, Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) f 16720 (Dec. 31, 1963); Tri-Valley Pacing Aes'n,
60 F.T.C. 1134, 1173 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 329 F.2d 964 (9th Cir. 1964).
94. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249-50 (1951). "[Wjherever a lawful lower
price of a competitor threatens to deprive a seller of a customer, the seller, to retain
that customer, may in good faith meet that lower price." Id. at 242. Sunshine Biscults, Inc. v.
FTC, 306 F.2d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1962), distinguished that case: "Since the Standard Oil
Company had made the lower price. . . only to retain its customers and had not acquired
new customers ...the question presented in the instant case [whether Sunshine could grant
discounts to purchasers not then its customers] was not before the Supreme Court." The
court held that Sunshine had not violated the act. The FTC announced that it would not
follow the Sunshine decision, but would continue to apply its interpretation of the Standard
Oil rule. See FTC Lssues Explanation For Not Seeking Supreme Court Review of a

Decision by US. Court of Appeals For 7th Circuit, FTC News Releasc, Nov. 23, 1962.
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meet a competitor's efforts to steal an old customer, not to attract new customers.
This limitation has been severely criticized95-first, because section 2 (b) permits
a seller to meet services furnished by any competitor, not merely the seller's
competitor; and, secondly, because it is by no means clear when an old customer,
who has not dealt with the seller for a period of time, ceases to be an old customer and becomes a new customer againY6 Another restriction, but fully in
accord with the good faith provision of section 2 (b),17 precludes the seller from
relying on the defense unless he shows, in each instance, that he knew of the
competitors' offers to his customers and formulated his policy solely to defeat
their efforts.98 The defense will not be available if the seller goes beyond meeting
the competitor's offer and actually surpasses it.9
A recent Commission decision' 00 has, in effect, cast grave doubts on the usefulness of this defense by making it available only if the competition met involved goods of the same grade and quality which are marketed under similar
conditions. This decision follows the reasoning of the Atalanta case' 01 that competing customers are those who deal in goods of the same quality and grade.
Yet, in practice, a seller does not always know the exact type of goods that his
Indications that the FTC may be more receptive to a change in its strict rule can be seen
in Continental Baking Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) 1 16720, at 21647 (Dec. 31, 1963). See
also 1955 Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 184.
95. See id. at 182-84. The Committee felt that § 2(b) should not be confined to
defensive reductions, as this would not be "in keeping with ... principles of competition, and
would . . . foster tight and rigid commercial relationships by insulating them from market
forces." Id. at 184.
96. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 59 F.T.C. 674, 682-83 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
97. See note 91 supra.
98. E.g., Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) ff 16753, at 21691-92
(July 11, 1963), aff'd, Trade Reg. Rep. (1965 Trade Cas.) 1 71491 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 396-97 (1948), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). However, there Is
evidence that the seller is held only to a showing that he gave discriminatory allowances In
good faith, believing that he was meeting competition. FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324
U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945). A recent Commission decision injected the question of lawfulness
into the defense. In Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, 60 F.T.C. 1134 (1962), rev'd on other grounds,
329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964), the FTC stated that the "respondent must at least show the
existence of circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the lower
prices it was meeting were lawful prices." Id. at 1173. (Footnote omitted.) This seems to be
supported by Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951). However, the courts of appeals
in Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 991 (1956), and Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956), have refused to
place the burden of proof on the seller in showing that a competitor's prices were lawful.
The Attorney General's Committee has suggested that the lawfulness of a competitor's price
be an element of the good faith requirement, but not an absolute condition for invoking the
defense. 1955 Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 182.
99. Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc., supra note 98, ff 16753, at 21690.
100. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) 1116800, at 21755 (Feb. 10,
1964).
101. Atalanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958).
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competitor is offering his customers. However, this area of the section 2(b)
defense has been further confused by the recent Supreme Court decision in
FTC v. Borden Co.' 0 2 The Court rejected any consideration of market demand
or advertising differences in determining whether goods were of like grade or
quality for the purpose of deciding whether section 2(a) had been violated. 1' 3
Although the Court recognized that the Commission has adopted a contrary position in determining whether the section 2(b) defense applies, 0 1 it refused to
resolve this contradiction.1o5 If the Borden decision is extended to section 2(b),
the defense would be more available, 00 since the defendant would have to show
only physical or chemical identity and not commercial similarity.
Whether a buyer charged with a section 5 violation can avail himself of the
section 2(b) defense has not been determined. It has been suggested that to
allow a buyer who has created the conditions which establish a section 2(b)
defense to take advantage of the defense himself would be contrary to the intent
of the statute. 0 7 A general denial of section 2(b) benefits to a buyer charged
with a section 5 violation would appear to be too harsh. If a buyer solicits
special treatment from all the suppliers of certain products, he, obviously, should
not be able to use the meeting competition defense. But, if a buyer notifies his
usual supplier that a competing seller has offered him special benefits and that,
unless this offer is met, sound business policy dictates changing suppliers, it
would seem unreasonable not to allow the buyer to avail himself of the section
2(b) defense.
Another defense available, although clearly disfavored, is that of de vinimis. s It is rarely invoked effectively. 0 9 The Commission, in Quaker Oats
Co.," 0 inferred that a supplier's payment of 250 dollars to a retailer for a special
102.

34 U.J,. Week 42SS (March 23, 1966). Although the decision involved a 2(a)

violation, it may influence future 2(b) decisions.
103.

Id. at 4290.

104. See Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.)

161S), at 21755

(July 11, 1963); Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923, 952 (1953), order vacated on other
grounds, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 396 (1953).

105. 34 U.S.L. Week at 4290.
106. Id. at 4294 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
107. Max Factor & Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) 1 16992, at 22066-67 n.4 (July 22,
1964).

10S. See Skinner v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956); cf. E.
Edelmann & Co. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (195);
Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 US. 933
(1957).
109. See Furr's, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.)
17352 (Oct. 20, 1965). The trial

examiner dismissed § 5 charges against a supermarket chain for inducing a number of
suppliers to grant promotional allowances for its special sale. The dismissal waz based, inter
alia, upon the ground that purchases of these suppliers' products by some of Furr's competitors were so small as to be de minimis. Id. 5 17352, at 22516 n.6. The FTC, although it
accepted the examiner's decision, stated that it did not pass on the validity of this defense,
and its silence was not to be construed as approval Id. ff 17352, at 22521.
110. 60 F.T.C. 79S (1962). The dissent felt that de minimis should apply. It stated that
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advertising display was not de minimis although the supplier's advertising expenditures amounted to millions of dollars annually. The Commission's denial
of this defense is based on two factors. The de minimis doctrine would seem to
have little significance where no effect on competition need be shown."1 ' Furthermore, the Commission will view the discriminatory service or payment, not in
light of the contributor's total advertising expenditure, but from the standpoint
of the recipient's advertising budget.1 12 Therefore, the buyer-recipient charged
with a section 5 violation will rarely be able to avail himself of this defense.
Under normal circumstances, the contributions received would not be de minimis, since, without these contributions, he would not be able to operate the
special programs which cause the unfair competition.113

IV. THE "Max Factor APPROACH"
In the past, the Commission has often chosen to prosecute both the buyer
under section 5 and the various sellers under section 2(d) or section 2(e).114
This method of enforcement is not only time-consuming, but also ineffective
and inequitable. In situations where section 5 is applicable, it is the buyer, seeking financing for a special project, who applies pressure on the seller for discriminatory contributions or services.115 The large seller with an organized advertising program surely finds these requests annoying, while the small seller
feels more coerced, believing that failure to participate would, at least, cost him
the good will of the buyer. 10 Yet, under the Commission's procedure, both the
buyer and the seller would face a cease and desist order. Commissioner Elman,
in Max Factor & Co.," 7 attempted to resolve this situation. The Commissioner,
noting that "unfair conduct by the buyer, not the seller, was the primary evil
at which the Act was aimed, 118 dismissed section 5 charges against Max Factor.
The Commission felt that the entry of cease and desist orders against a few
the Commission has more important things to occupy its attention than issuing broad
non-discrimination orders when they are not warranted. Id. at 819-20.
111. There would appear to be some significance in invoking the defense to challenge the

commerce requirement. See Skinner v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762 (5th Cir.
1956).

112. In J. A. Folger & Co., 61 F.T.C. 1166 (1962), the Commission held that payments
made to a supermarket, although only $150, "were . . . substantial when viewed in the
light of the whole [promotional] . . . activity because it was these amounts plus the
contributions of others which permitted [the supermarket] . . . to engage in [these] . . .
promotional efforts." Id. at 1186. Cf. Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co., 59 F.T.C. 693 (1961).
1113. See J. A. Folger & Co., 61 F.T.C. 1166, 1186 (1962).
114. See, e.g., FTC v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 908 (1965); Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1962);
Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
115. Max Factor & Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) f1 16992, at 22065 (July 22, 1964);
Abby Kent Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) g 17310, at 22466 (Aug. 9, 1965) (dissenting
opinion).
116. Max Factor & Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) If 16992, at 22065 (July 22, 1964).
117. Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) ff 16992 (July 22, 1964).

118. Id. ff 16992, at 22066. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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scattered firms of the many who gave allowances to this one retailer would he
inequitable and ineffective. 1 9 Rather, the FTC would bring section 5 proceedings against the buyer. This approach seems to be the most sensible and, in the
long run, the most effective way of reducing discrimination in certain industries.
In industries where competition is high, where there are few buyers, many
sellers, and little differentiation between products, it appears to make little sense
to punish the sellers. Those who are not under the order will certainly yield to
pressure from a large buyer. Those under the order will be tempted to violate
it in order to meet competition and stay in business.-" In other industries, where
competitive forces are less keen, and the buyer-power is more restricted, the FTC
can approach the problem by using its more traditional manner of enforcement .2 1 The Commission should examine the industry pressures in each situation and fashion its enforcement policy according to the means best calculated
to achieve the aim of Congress-protection of the small enterprise (both buyer
and seller) from the huge buying power of the large chain stores'2 V. CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, the Commission appears to have reverted to its more orthodox
approach. In Abby Kent Co.,'21 the Commission was faced with widespread
violations of the advertising provisions of the act within the garment industry.
This was an excellent opportunity to apply the Max Factor doctrine. The Commission, while acknowledging that "department and specialty store chains to a
large extent have been responsible for discriminatory allowances in the industry . .. ,4 decided against enforcing the provisions of section 5. Instead, it
chose to enforce consent decrees against approximately one per cent of the
30,000 garment manufacturers- 2 5 This method of enforcement appears to offer
little hope for the termination of section 2(d) violations in the industry.2 0
119.

Id. U 16992, at 22065. The Commission later dismissed simil

orders againt Nestle-

Lemur, Lanolin Plus, and other sellers who contributed to this retailer's promotional
campaign. See Nestle-Lemur Co. & Lanolin Plus, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.)
1699S
(July 31, 1964); Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.)
170D7 (July 27,
1964); cf. FTC v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687, 694 n.21 (5th Cir. 1964), catL denied,

380 US. 903 (1965).
120. See Abby Kent Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) U 17310, at 22465 (Aug. 9, 1965)
(dissenting opinion).
121. That is, enforcement of § 2(d) or § 2(e) against the seller and § 5 against the
buyer.
122. See Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n, 60 F.T.C. 1134, at 1177-73 (1962) (dissenting opinion),
rev'd on other grounds, 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1961); text accompanying note 10 _iupra.
123. Trade Reg. Rep. (F.T.C.) ff 17310 (Aug. 9, 1965).
124. Id. 17310, at 22464 n.3.
125. Id. g 17310, at 22466 (dissenting opinion).
126. Commissioner Elman, in his dissent, called upon the Commission to explore new
approaches to meet 2(d) and 2(e) violations in such quasi-monopsonistic industries. He
suggested: (1) the M1ax Factor approach; and (2) use of the Trade Regulation Rule
procedure, whereby the FTC would establish precise guidelines under § 1.65 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure for the industries. (This procedure would remove

